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Evolving Role and Challenges for the
International Monetary Fund
FRAtois GANVITI*

Many companies have found it useful to define their main objective in a mission statement. To the outsiders the mission statement projects a clear and preferably positive image
of the company. To the insiders it provides a sense of common purpose.
When the Articles of Agreement (Articles)' of the International Monetary Fund (Fund)
were adopted at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, the concept of mission statement
did not exist. However, the drafters of the Articles found it useful to set forth the purposes
of the Fund in Article I and to state that the Fund would be guided in all its decisions by
these purposes. These purposes clearly demonstrated the monetary character of the Fund:
it was established to promote the stability of exchange rates, the financing of balance of
payment deficits, and the liberalization of payments for current international transactions.
In contrast, the Fund's sister organization, the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank), was established as a development agency.
The successive amendments of the Fund's Articles in 1969, 1978 and 1990 did not change
the monetary character of the Fund. Actually, the first two amendments strengthened the
role of the Fund as the central monetary institution. The first amendment (1969) gave the
Fund the power to supplement existing reserve assets through allocations of special drawing
rights in order to meet "the long-term global need, as and when it arises, for additional
liquidity in the world." 2
The second amendment (1978), drawing on the failed experience of the par value system,
recognized the freedom of Fund members to adopt exchange arrangements of their choice,
which legalized the practice of floating currencies. The same amendment, however, gave
the Fund two new mandates, both of which expanded its role as a monetary institution.
One was to oversee the international monetary system to ensure its effective operation. The
other was to oversee the compliance by members with their newly defined obligation to
cooperate together and with the Fund in the conduct of their economic, financial, and
*Frmnois Gianviti is the General Counsel of the International Monetary Fund. The views expressed in this
article are those of the author. They are not necessarily those of the International Monetary Fund.
1. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/
ft/aa/ [hereinafter Articles of Agreement].
2. First Amendment to Articles of Agreement, July 28, 1969.
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exchange rate policies "to assure orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a stable
system of exchange rates." 3 More specifically, the Fund was required to exercise "firm surveillance" over its members' exchange rate policies, with a view in particular to avoiding
competitive exchange rate depreciation for fear ofa return to the pre-World War I "beggar
thy neighbor" policy of some countries.
Although the monetary character of the Fund is still enshrined in its Articles, a profound
evolution has taken place gradually, which now results in sharply contrasting views as to
what should be the role of the Fund. This evolution has affected both the jurisdiction of
the Fund as a regulatory agency and its balance of payments assistance as a financial agency.
In both cases, there has been a substitution of broad judgment-based powers for rigid and
objective rules. The replacement of the par value system by the exercise of surveillance has
given great latitude to the Fund to define the scope of its involvement in its members'
external and domestic policies. The invention of conditionality in the early years of the
Fund, followed by the implicit, and later explicit recognition of the Fund's authority to
adopt different policies on the terms and conditions of its financial assistance (including the
possibility of specifying different rates and maturities for different policies), in order to
address different balance of payments problems, have given the Fund the power to withhold
or grant assistance on a case-by-case basis and to determine the cost and duration of its
assistance with a large degree of flexibility. This power was even strengthened by allowing
the Fund, at the time of the second amendment, to provide concessional assistance (including grants) to developing countries, this assistance being funded from the profits on
the sale of gold held by the Fund at the time of the second amendment.
Consequently, it is not surprising that the existence of such powers should lead to attempts to steer the course of the Fund's activities in new directions. National governments
or groups of governments (such as the Group of Seven: Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, United Kingdom, and United States, also known as the G-7), international organizations (such as the U.N.), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) hold and express
views (sometimes conflicting) about the actions the Fund should take or refrain from taking.
For instance, should the Fund refrain from providing assistance to countries blacklisted by
the U.N. General Assembly, the U.S. Government, or the Financial Action Task Force,
because these countries violate human rights, harbor terrorists or war criminals, or do not
cooperate in the fight against drug trafficking or money laundering? Vice-versa, should
countries that cooperate in the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, or money laundering be rewarded with generous Fund financing? Should the Fund engage in debt forgiveness
in a systematic fashion as proposed by some countries and NGOs? Should the Fund use its
leverage to liberalize trade and capital movements? Should the Fund ensure compliance
with the core labor standards adopted by the International Labour Organization?
All these attempts, successful or unsuccessful, to use the Fund for different objectives
have led to a blurring of its image as a monetary institution. Another factor is the simplification inherent in any form of communication through the mass media. Thus, in press
communiques issued at the end of international meetings, the Fund, the World Bank, and
regional development banks are usually referred to as the "international financial institutions" (IFI), as if they were as fungible as the money they provide. Partly for the same
reason, the terminology used for development banks' operations is used to describe the

3. Second Amendment to Articles of Agreement, Apr. 1, 1978.
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Fund's financial transactions with its members. These transactions, which are the vehicle
for Fund assistance from its General Resources Account, take the form of exchanges of
currencies. Technically, the Fund sells foreign exchange against the purchasing member's
currency. These exchanges of currencies (called "transactions") were designed to follow the
model of currency swaps, for monetary intervention, between central banks. However, they
are commonly described as loans, even in some Fund publications, which make them appear
to be commercial bank loans. Similarly, while the objective of the Fund's assistance is very
specific, in that it is intended to help the recipient country overcome a balance of payments
problem, governments often find it politically preferable to present this assistance as a
source of financing for domestic expenditure (budget deficit, sectoral lending), a clearly
more understandable and attractive objective for the local populace.
Another reason for the present confusion between the respective roles of the Fund and
development banks is that, instead of referring to the immediate purpose of the Fund's
assistance (i.e., the resolution of a member's balance of payments problem), this assistance
is presented in terms of the country's ultimate objectives, which are the resumption of
economic growth and, for poorer countries, the reduction of poverty. At this level of generality, all international financial institutions appear interchangeable. In particular, the separation between the Fund and the World Bank seems rather artificial, and their merger may
seem to be an inescapable consequence of this evolution. The common initiatives of the
Fund and the World Bank for Poverty Reduction and Growth and for Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries illustrate this trend. There is no doubt, however, that a movement in the
opposite direction has found some support. Efforts have been made to better define the
respective roles of the Fund and the World Bank. There have also been proposals to circumscribe the role of the Fund, not unlike that of a central bank, to short-term financing
for external liquidity problems and systemic risks.
There is a play by Luigi Pirandello about six characters in search of an author. The Fund
is more like a single character with many playwrights, being asked to play the jack-of-alltrades and to be available for any objective that needs to be achieved through the exercise
of its powers.
The evolution that has taken place since the inception of the Fund has affected the two
main aspects of the Fund's mandate: the exercise of its jurisdiction and the provision of its
financial assistance. In addition, it has affected the Fund as an institution, both internally
(powers and structure of its organs) and externally (relations with the membership and with
other organizations). Those three aspects (jurisdictional, financial, and institutional) will be
examined in turn.
I. Jurisdictional Aspects
As a regulatory agency, the Fund oversees the compliance of its members with those
obligations under the Articles that constitute the Fund's code of conduct. These obligations
fall into two categories and are listed in two different Articles. Article VIII, sections 2(a)
and 3 prohibit restrictions on current payments, multiple currency practices and discriminatory currency arrangements, except in certain circumstances. Article IV requires members
to collaborate with the Fund and other members to assure orderly exchange arrangements
and to promote a stable system of exchange rates.
The first category of obligations has remained unchanged since the original Articles,
while the second was introduced by the second amendment, which may explain the sharp
contrast in their respective formulations. The obligations in Article VIII are obligations to
WINTER 2001
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refrain from taking certain actions in the area of exchange controls and exchange rates.
Therefore, once the meaning of these terms is understood, the scope of these obligations
is clearly delineated.
In contrast, the obligations set forth in Article IV are defined in terms of the objectives
to be pursued rather than in terms of actions to be taken or avoided; they are broadly but
loosely formulated, and reassuringly take into account the capacity of each member to
comply. This means that, if there is a dispute on the scope of a member's obligations under
Article I, an interpretation of this provision will be required, and the Fund itself will be
the final interpreter.4 Therefore, the loose formulation of Article IV-with a proliferation
of adjectives such as "sound," "orderly," or "reasonable," all of which denote subjective
criteria-also gives ample room to the Fund, when implementing this provision, to define
the obligations of its members either in general terms or on a case-by-case basis. In some
countries, had it been part of their national legislation, Article IV might have failed to pass
the constitutional requirement of sufficient precision to ensure predictability of result and
uniform treatment. This is only one of the odd features of this provision which, after twenty
years of application, remains in many respects unclear and, probably for that reason, has
become a key element of the Fund's expanding role. Napoleon said that a constitution must
be short and obscure. Article IV is not short but it is indeed obscure.
A.

LIBERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS (ArICLE VIII)

This aspect of the Fund's regulatory powers is often referred to as the Fund's approval
jurisdiction: three types of measures (exchange restrictions on current payments, multiple
currency practices, and discriminatory currency arrangements) are prohibited unless they
are approved by the Fund. The Fund's approval is granted on the basis of criteria that are
formulated in general decisions of the Fund. For instance, an exchange restriction may be
approved only if it is temporary, justified by balance of payments reasons and nondiscriminatory (i.e., no discrimination among Fund members). An exception is made for restrictions imposed for reasons of national or international security, which are not subject to
those conditions.
The rules governing the Fund's approval jurisdiction have remained remarkably stable
since the inception of the Fund. Yet, in recent years, two related issues have attracted the
attention of Fund members. The first one is really not new at all: it is whether Article VIII,
section 2(b) should be revived, through interpretation and/or amendment, to help countries
facing a major debt crisis. The second one is whether the Fund's approval jurisdiction
should be extended to cover capital movements.
1. Article VIII, Section 2(b)
When a company becomes unable to meet its liabilities, it files for bankruptcy. This has
two consequences: first, it imposes a stay on creditors' actions, which gives time to decide
whether the company can be rehabilitated or should be liquidated; and second, it gives
jurisdiction to a court, which will monitor the negotiations between debtor and creditor
and rule on disputes between them.
There is no similar procedure for states. The traditional justification is that a state does
not become insolvent because it can always levy taxes. However, insolvency is not the rele-

4. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. XXIX.
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vant test for the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings. The test is illiquidity and a state may
be as illiquid as a private debtor, particularly when it is indebted to foreign creditors whose
claims are payable in foreign exchange. For those payments, the ability to print local currency does not help if there is not enough foreign exchange in the country's economy.
Foreign exchange has to be earned or borrowed ahead and, in the meantime, the state's
foreign debt cannot be serviced. Exchange controls and surrender requirements may be
imposed but they have a negative impact on the country's economy.
From time to time, and particularly when a major crisis strikes, suggestions are made for
the creation of an international bankruptcy court or at least for an equivalent mechanism,
but usually the interest generated by those suggestions wanes as soon as the crisis that
prompted them is over.
In 1995-96, both the Fund and the Group of Ten studied the feasibility of creating an
international bankruptcy court. The conclusion was that this creation would raise many
difficulties and the world community was not ready for it. More recently (2001), however,
the First Deputy Managing Director of the Fund has proposed the creation of a sovereign
debt restructuring mechanism for states whose external debt has become unsustainable.
As an alternative and more modest proposal, various proposals were made in the midnineties and use Article VIII, section 2(b) as a proxy for a stay on foreign creditors' actions.
Assuming that a government imposes a moratorium on payments by resident debtors to
their foreign creditors, this measure would constitute an exchange control regulation. This
restriction, to the extent that it affected current payments, would have to be approved by
the Fund; if it affected capital movements, it would not require Fund approval. Under
Article VIII, section 2(b), once an exchange control regulation is found to be consistent
with the Fund's Articles of Agreement, which would be the case here, exchange contracts
contrary to that regulation cannot be enforced in the courts of other countries. Therefore,
in the case of a moratorium, other countries would have to cooperate with the country
imposing the moratorium by refusing to enforce the creditors' claims in their courts.
If Article VIII, section 2(b) could be used to suspend enforcement of exchange contracts
against private debtors, why not use it to suspend their actions against sovereign debtors?
This was a very attractive suggestion, but it raised some difficulties. The first problem
was that, in order for a moratorium to constitute an exchange control regulation, it has to
apply to persons other than the government imposing the moratorium. It is well established
in the law of the Fund that a government's default on its own debt is not an exchange
restriction. Therefore, it is outside the scope of Article VIII, section 2(b). This would
seriously limit the usefulness of resorting to that provision.
The second problem was that Article VIII, section 2(b) had already been interpreted rather
restrictively by the courts of some major countries. In the United Kingdom and the United
States, courts have taken the view that Article VIII, section 2(b) applies only to a very limited
type of debts: those that arise from a contract for the exchange of currencies. This interpretation is based on the reference to "exchange contract" in Article VIII, section 2(b), a somewhat ambiguous concept, which has been interpreted more broadly by the courts of other
countries. Moreover, in Germany, the courts have decided that Article VIII, section 2(b) does
not apply to restrictions on capital movements, in part because it is inserted in a provision,
of which the first section deals exclusively with restrictions on current payments.
As it is not easy to amend the Fund's Articles or to adopt an interpretation that would
contradict the judicial interpretation that prevails in some major countries, there has been
no further attempt in either of those directions. However, the possibility of an amendment
WINTER 2001
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or an authoritative interpretation of Article VIII, section 2(b) by the Fund has not been
ruled out and is raised from time to time in discussions among Fund members.
The current emphasis on the need to cooperate against financial crime, in general, and
money laundering, in particular, creates a new perspective. Since a payment or transfer in
violation of exchange controls is a crime, countries that have undertaken to cooperate
against all forms of financial crime should take action against the laundering of the proceeds
of this crime in their territories and, in particular, against laundering through their banking
system. It is not clear, however, whether this cooperation should include a duty to impose
a stay on creditors' actions in their courts. If it did not, however, the courts would be allowed
to order a payment that would constitute the commission of a crime against the laws of the
country imposing the moratorium.
2. CapitalMovements
The drafters of the Fund's Articles were ambitious but they were also realistic. After the
end of World War II, an immediate priority was the resumption of multilateral trade, which
required a liberalization of current payments, but a premature liberalization ofcapital movements could have undermined the fragile post-war economies. Therefore, the sovereignty
of members with respect to exchange controls on capital movements was preserved; restrictions on capital movements could be imposed without Fund approval.5 However, while
Fund members could have access to the Fund's financial assistance for their current account
deficits, they could not use the Fund's resources to meet a large or sustained outflow of
capital, and the Fund could request a member to exercise controls to prevent such use of
the Fund's resources.6
Since Bretton Woods, the situation has changed radically. Capital markets have become
a major source of financing both for private and sovereign debtors. A number of bilateral
or regional agreements liberalizing capital movements have been entered into (e.g., European Economic Community, NAFTA, and OECD) and the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS) contains provisions on the liberalization of service-related investments.
Economists generally recognize the beneficial effect of a liberalization of capital movements
as it allows investors to make the best possible use of their savings and entrepreneurs to
expand their activities. There is also an indirect benefit for the governments of both parties
as they are able to collect more taxes, not to mention other benefits for the recipient country
such as economic growth and, with the creation of new enterprises through direct investment, the transfer of knowledge.
However, this rosy picture must be nuanced. The freedom of capital movements increases
the risk of sudden outflows of capital when there is a loss of confidence in a country's ability
to service its external debt. There may also be political reasons for preventing foreigners
from acquiring dominant positions in strategically important sectors of a country's economy
(e.g., armaments, telecommunications). Finally, many countries require local savings to be
invested locally in order to provide public and private borrowers with inexpensive resources,
while the cost to them would be greater if they had to compete for the same resources with
foreign borrowers.

5. Id. art. VI, § 3.
6. Id. art. VI, § 1.
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For all these reasons, a liberalization of capital movements will usually be a gradual
process. It must be accompanied with adequate macroeconomic and structural policies that
will generate confidence in the country's economy and build up a domestic financial system
able to prevent or withstand possible shocks.
When the suggestion of an amendment of the Articles was put forward by some members
a few years ago in the Fund, the initial reaction was rather favorable. At the 1997 Annual
Meeting of the Board of Governors, the Interim Committee of the Board of Governors on
the International Monetary System (generally known as the Interim Committee and now
replaced by the International Monetary and Financial Committee) endorsed the principle
of an amendment that would make the liberalization of capital movements one of the purposes of the Fund and give the Fund jurisdiction over such movements.
Soon thereafter, however, in the wake of the Asian crisis, the process began to unravel.
In some developed countries, trade unions denounced capital liberalization as a ploy to
transfer investments to countries where labor was cheap and unregulated. Some NGOs
claimed that the globalization of the economy was a threat to the environment. A number,
of developing countries were concerned that capital liberalization would undermine their
weak economies and generate instability. Some developed countries were concerned that
their laws against foreign investment in strategic sectors would have to be repealed.
A counter-proposal was put forward by one member. Instead of expanding the Fund's
jurisdiction by creating obligations for all members, why not rather use the Fund's conditionality and make capital liberalization a condition for the Fund's financial assistance?
Thus, users of Fund resources would have to open their territories to foreign investments,
which would be highly beneficial for them since they were mostly developing countries. In
contrast, developed countries, which do not use the Fund's resources, would not be subject
to this liberalization. However, this proposal had very little support because it implied that
capital liberalization would be forced by the Fund upon reluctant countries that had no
choice but to submit to the Fund's yoke. Not only would it give capital liberalization a
negative connotation, but also this liberalization would probably be short-lived, as countries, once free from Fund conditionality, would probably revert to their earlier practices.
A compromise proposal, prepared by the staff, was to liberalize capital movements in two
stages. The first stage would liberalize all payments and transfers for capital transactions
once the transactions themselves had been liberalized. The process would be very similar
to the liberalization of current payments. Under the Fund's Articles, payments for trade
transactions may not be restricted if the trade transactions themselves are permitted. There
is no obligation to authorize payments for illegal trade transactions. Therefore, by analogy,
assuming that a particular investment is permitted, all payments and transfers relating to
the investment would have to be permitted. If a disinvestment was permitted, the repatriation of the proceeds could be made.
The second stage would be a gradual liberalization by each member of capital transactions. There would be no timetable, no obligation to liberalize but, once a type of transaction had been liberalized, no restriction could be imposed without Fund approval. The
main incentive for liberalizing would be investor confidence. The Fund would not force
countries to liberalize, including through the use of its conditionality. This would be a
purely voluntary, " la carte" process.
This proposal has not been discussed by the Executive Board and, for the time being,
capital liberalization is no longer on the Fund's agenda.
WINTER 2001
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SURVEILLANCE (ARTICLE IV)

The present Article IV is a product of the second amendment (1978) of the Fund's
Articles of Agreement and it can only be understood in light of what was called the collapse
of the "par value" or "gold exchange" system that had been in place since the inception of
the Fund.
The original Article IV, as adopted at the Bretton Woods Conference, required Fund
members to establish a par value either in terms of gold or in terms of the 1944 (gold) U.S.
dollar and to maintain exchange rates within a margin of 1 percent above or below parity.
The parity was calculated on the basis of the respective par values of the currencies of Fund
members. The obligation to maintain exchange rates based on parities could be performed
by imposing fixed exchange rates or through market intervention. An alternative way was
for a country to stand ready to exchange its currency for gold. In practice, all countries but
the United States adopted the former approach while the United States adopted the latter.
Therefore, the dollar rather than gold was seen as the anchor of the system as most countries
'effectively maintained exchange rates in terms of the U.S. dollar as the dollar was deemed
to be as good as gold.
Under the par value system, changes in par value could take place but-beyond an initial
threshold-only with the consent of the Fund and to correct a fundamental disequilibrium.
In reality, however, some unauthorized practices developed: some devaluations took place
without the consent of the Fund and some countries let their currencies "float" outside the
permitted margins. More importantly, the decision of the United States in 1971 to suspend
the convertibility of the U.S. dollar into gold marked the end of the par value system, if
not dejure at least defacto.
During the following years, an intense debate pitted the supporters of fixed exchange
rates against those of floating rates. The outcome was the new Article TV as adopted at the
time of the second amendment.
The new provision was a political compromise with the necessary calculated ambiguities
to allow both sides to claim victory. The general idea was that, instead of either requiring
the maintenance of fixed exchange rates or giving full freedom to members, there would
be a general obligation for all members "to collaborate with the Fund and other members
to assure orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange rates."7
Therefore, instead of the former obligation to achieve a certain result, there is now an
obligation to cooperate toward common goals.
In order to give more concrete substance to this rather vague obligation, Article IV lists
specific obligations, which do not exhaust the scope of the obligation to cooperate but
provide guidance to the Fund and its members in the implementation of Article IV. Moreover, in order to make these obligations effective, the Fund was given the mandate to oversee
the compliance of each member with these obligations.
These principles were reflected in Sections I and 3 of Article IV.
Section 1. General obligations of members
Recognizing that the essential purpose of the international monetary system is to provide a
framework that facilitates the exchange of goods, services, and capital among countries, and

7. Id. art. IV.
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that sustains sound economic growth, and that a principal objective is the continuing development of the orderly underlying conditions that are necessary for financial and economic
stability, each member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund and other members to assure
orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange rates. In particular,
each member shall:
(i) endeavor to direct its economic and financial policies toward the objective of fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability, with due regard to
its circumstances;
(ii) seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic and financial conditions and a monetary system that does not tend to produce erratic disruptions;
(iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to
prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members; and
(iv) follow exchange policies compatible with the undertakings under this Section.
Section 3. Surveillance over exchange arrangements
(a) The Fund shall oversee the international monetary system in order to ensure its
effective operation, and shall oversee the compliance of each member with its obligations under Section 1 of this Article.
(b) In order to fulfill its functions under (a) above, the Fund shall exercise firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of members, and shall adopt specific principles for the guidance of all members with respect to those policies. Each member
shall provide the Fund with the information necessary for such surveillance, and,
when requested by the Fund, shall consult with it on the member's exchange rate
policies. The principles adopted by the Fund shall be consistent with cooperative
arrangements by which members maintain the value of their currencies in relation
to the value of the currency or currencies of other members, as well as with other
exchange arrangements of a member's choice consistent with the purposes of the
Fund and Section 1 of this Article. These principles shall respect the domestic
social and political policies of members, and in applying these principles the Fund
shall pay due regard to the circumstances of members. 8
1. Ambiguities ofArticle IV (Sections I and 3)
(a) Article IV, section 1 is the only provision of the Articles that begins with a preamble.
Whether this preamble was necessary and what it was intended to achieve has not been
explained and, absent any legislative history that could shed light on the reasons for its
inclusion, the interpreter is reduced to conjectures.
The most probable explanation is that the drafters did not want the end of the par value
system to be seen as the end of the international monetary system. There was still such a
system, albeit a new one and the Fund would oversee its effective operation. 9 However,
this system could not be defined in terms of obligations of members (except for the brief
and obscure prohibition in Section l(iii) against "manipulating... the international monetary system"'10 ). It could only be described in terms of what it was supposed to achieve,
i.e., to provide the "framework that facilitates the exchange of goods, services and capital
among countries, and that sustains sound economic growth."'
8. Id.
9. Id.art. IV,§ 3(a).
10. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. IV, § l(iii).
11. Id. art. Vl, § .
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Because the word "purpose" is used both in the preamble of Article IV, section 1, and in
Article I (which lists the purposes of the Fund), a hasty reading of the preamble could lead
to the conclusion that the purpose in that provision has been added to the purposes of the
Fund. The consequence would be that the Fund would have in all its activities, and in
particular in the provision of its financial assistance, to facilitate trade and capital liberalization and sustain sound economic growth. Also, the verb "to facilitate" is sometimes read
as a synonym for "to achieve," which would mean that the Fund should make trade and
capital liberalization a condition of its financial assistance.
This is clearly a mistaken interpretation of the preamble. The purpose of the international monetary system is not a purpose of the Fund and making trade and capital liberalization possible through monetary stability is not the same thing as liberalizing them.
(b) After the preamble and the general obligation to collaborate in assuring orderly exchange arrangements and promoting a stable system of exchange rates, Article IV, section
1 lists four specific obligations of members as corollaries of the general obligation. Two of
these obligations relate to economic and financial policies or underlying economic and
financial conditions of members. The other two obligations relate to exchange rates or
exchange policies.
With great logic, Article IV, section 3(a) requires the Fund to oversee the compliance of
each member with its obligations under Section 1. Then comes the unexpected. Article IV,
section 3(b) states: "In order to fulfill its functions under (a) above, the Fund shall exercise
firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of members, and shall adopt specific policies for the guidance of all members with respect to those policies." 12 There are two possible readings of this provision, neither of which is fully satisfactory. The first one is to
deem all the obligations listed in Section 1 to be exchange rate policies, which would require
the Fund to exercise firm surveillance and adopt specific principles not only on the last two
specific obligations in Section 1 (exchange rates and exchange policies), but also on the first
two (economic and financial policies or conditions). Then, the Fund would really fulfill its
functions of overseeing compliance with all the obligations in Section 1. The objection,
however, is that the first two obligations in Section 1 have nothing to do with exchange
rate policies and are not easily dealt with in specific principles.
The second reading of Section 3(b) focuses on the words "exchange rate policies" understood literally, i.e., to the exclusion of economic and financial policies or conditions.
The objection is that, if firm surveillance and specific principles are limited to exchange
rate policies strictly defined, the Fund will not be fulfilling all its functions under Section
3(a). This point was conceded by the Fund in 1977, when it approved the staff document
entitled "Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies," which adopts the second of the two
meanings mentioned above. The document recognizes that exchange rate policies are only
one of the two types of policies governed by Article IV, section 1. It also recognizes not
only "that there is a close relationship between domestic and international economic policies," 13 a distinction that refers to the two groups of obligations in Article IV, section 1,
but also that the appraisal of a member's exchange rate policies "shall be made within the
framework of a comprehensive analysis of the general economic situation and economic
policy strategy of the member, and shall recognize that domestic as well as external policies

12. Id. art. IV, § 3(b).
13. Id.
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can contribute to timely adjustment of the balance of payments. The appraisal shall take
into account the extent to which the policies of the member, including its exchange rate
policies, serve the objectives of the continuing development of the orderly underlying conditions that are necessary for financial stability, the promotion of sustained sound economic
growth, and reasonable levels of employment."' 4 Therefore, although the principles and
procedures set forth in the document deal only with exchange rate policies understood
literally (e.g., avoidance of unfair competitive depreciation or manipulation of exchange
rates, market interventions to counter disorderly conditions), the Fund's appraisal takes
into account both exchange rate and domestic (economic and financial) policies.
This question of interpretation seems now settled but an interesting development is
taking place. While it would have been premature at the time of the second amendment
for the Fund to adopt specific principles for the guidance of members in their economic
and financial policies, there is now a momentum in that direction through the adoption of
standards and codes of best practices.
It may be noted in passing that neither the principles for surveillance over exchange rate
policies nor the standards and codes that may be used in surveillance over domestic policies
constitute obligations for members. The Fund can provide guidance but the obligations of
members can only be prescribed by the Articles.
(c) According to the document "Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies" mentioned
above, the international economic policies governed by Article IV, section 1 are exchange
rate policies; the other policies governed by that provision are "domestic." Does it mean
that surveillance does not apply to international policies in areas such as trade and investment, although both are mentioned in the preamble? The Principles set forth in the document recognize the relevance of trade and investment policies, but only as an element to
assess exchange rate policies: the introduction or intensification, for balance of payments
reasons, of restrictions on trade or investments may denote the existence of inadequate
exchange rate policies; the same is true of incentives for capital inflows or outflows or if
there are unsustainable flows of private capital.
Therefore, trade liberalization as such is not an obligation under Article IV, which is
understandable since it is supposed to be achieved under the auspices of the World Trade
Organization. Nevertheless, the Fund does discuss trade issues. And when these issues are
discussed in a general or regional context, or if they are substantial with respect to a particular member, a representative of the WTO may attend the meeting as an observer.
Similarly, the liberalization of capital movements is not an obligation under Article IV,
and Article VI, section 3 explicitly recognizes the right of members to regulate capital
movements. However, the use of restrictions on capital inflows to prevent the appreciation
of the local currency could be seen as an attempt to manipulate exchange rates in order to
gain a competitive advantage.
(d) Perhaps the most difficult, and as yet unresolved, question ofinterpretation of Article
IV is whether the obligation to cooperate includes an obligation to sacrifice a country's self
interest to those of others. With respect to exchange rate policies, Article IV, section 1
provides an answer to this question: a member may not manipulate its exchange rates to
gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members. In practice, this intention may
be difficult to prove, but at least the prohibition is expressly formulated.

14. Id.
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In other cases, absent an equally explicit prohibition, the principle should be that countries are free to compete with each other. The clearest example would be competition to
attract foreign investments through tax incentives. In the trade area, the rules of the GATT
or GATS may prevent the granting of subsidies or other means of unfair competition, but
these prohibitions are outside the scope of the Fund's Articles.
Issues of deliberate international competition do not arise very often within the Fund.
For example, a country passes legislation that appears to give sanctuary to foreign criminals
if they deposit a large amount of money in the country's banks; the Fund postpones the
conclusion of the Article IV consultation until the country gives the necessary appeasements. Some countries, in order to encourage exports, accept the tax deductibility of bribes
paid by their residents to foreign public officials in connection with the negotiation of
procurement contracts; an OECD Convention prohibiting such practices (1997 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions) is adopted and, in the Fund, the staff will "recommend that such practices be
stopped." II It may be noted that a recommendation by the staff does not imply the existence
of an obligation under the Articles.
In other cases, the competitive advantage may be simply the result of domestic policy
choices. Nevertheless, a country's refusal to align itself with the laws and practices of other
countries may be seen by those countries as a failure to cooperate against what they regard
as criminal activities that are harmful to their economic or financial interests. The issue,
therefore, is whether Article IV imposes an obligation to cooperate for the success of other
countries' policies. For example, is there an obligation for a Fund member to amend its
banking secrecy laws and to inform other countries about banking or other transactions
that violate the tax laws, exchange controls, or criminal laws (money laundering, financing
of terrorism, or other illegal activities) of those countries and to take action against such
practices? The recognition of such an obligation would have far-reaching consequences, as
it would indirectly lead to an enforcement of foreign public laws, which normally requires
explicit treaty or statutory provisions. For instance, it is an established principle that countries do not collect the taxes of other countries. Nor do they enforce foreign criminal laws
in their courts; at most, the accused will be either tried under the local law if that law so
provides or extradited in accordance with the local law or international treaties. Similarly,
the refusal of courts in some countries to accept a broad interpretation of Article VIII,
section 2(b), as mentioned above, illustrates this reluctance to give effect to foreign public
laws, even when this effect is limited to civil remedies between private parties.
The traditional objections to the application of foreign public laws are that (1) there may
be, and often is, a conflict of interest between the foreign state enacting the law and the
local state (e.g., collecting taxes for the foreign state reduces the tax base for the local state)
and (2) foreign laws may be repugnant to the ethical principles of the local state (e.g.,
persecution of religious or racial minorities or of political opponents through criminal laws,
confiscatory tax laws, discriminatory exchange controls, etc.).
To overcome these obstacles, various means of achieving international cooperation
against international financial crime have been developed. The most common is the ne-

15. Guidance Note of July 2, 1997 on the Role of the Fund in Governance Issues, in Selected Decisionsand
Selected Documents of the InternationalMonetary Fund, Twenty-Fifth Issue, Washington, DC, Dec. 31, 2000
[hereinafter Selected Decisions], at 31, 37.
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gotiation of international treaties, on a bilateral or multilateral basis (e.g., the OECD Convention mentioned above on bribery of foreign public officials and the 1999 U.N. Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism). Exceptionally, in the exercise
of its peace-keeping powers, the U.N. Security Council may require the imposition of
financial sanctions against countries or individuals (e.g., Resolution 1373 (28 September
2001) of the Security Council requiring all States to "[c]riminalize the wilful provision or
collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are
to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts"16).
In recent years, a soft law approach to international cooperation against international
financial crime has been used. In various organizations (e.g., the OECD) or working groups
(e.g., the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF),
both created at the initiative of the G-7), principles are developed, which are presented as
recommendations not only for the members of the organization or of the working group
but also for other countries. For example, recommendations have been made by the FSF
on offshore financial centers and by the FATF on money laundering. Offshore financial
centers are subjected to particular scrutiny as their legislation or their administrative framework does not always adequately prevent or detect financial transactions that are linked to
international financial crime. Money laundering is criminalized and prosecuted as a means
of preventing criminals from enjoying the fruit of their crimes by making them appear
legitimate; those crimes (called "predicate offenses") may have been committed within the
country where the laundering takes place or abroad. In some countries, money laundering
applies not only to illegal earnings but also to illegal savings (tax evasion).
In order to make these recommendations more effective, various types of pressure may
be envisaged. Thus, jurisdictions (countries or dependencies) that refuse to cooperate and
comply with the recommendations of the FATF are publicly blacklisted ("name and shame")
by the FATF and economic "countermeasures" may be imposed against them. When the
noncooperative jurisdiction is a dependency, the blacklisting and the countermeasures apply
only to that territory. This is in contrast to the Fund's surveillance where each member is
responsible for the actions of its dependent territories.
In order to further strengthen the effectiveness of these recommendations, the Fund may
be asked by the countries supporting the recommendations to propagate them through its
various activities. In the case of offshore financial centers and money laundering, the Fund
has agreed to provide technical assistance to countries that wish to have their legislation
and administrative arrangements reviewed and, if necessary, adjusted. This assistance is
provided by Fund staff under the Fund's Financial Sector Assessment Program.
It has also been suggested that the Fund should give even greater effect to the recommendations of the FATF on money laundering by including these recommendations in the
scope of its surveillance under Article IV and refusing to provide financial assistance to
members that do not comply with the recommendations.
These issues were discussed by the Fund's Executive Board in April 2001. According to
the summing up by the Acting Chairman (April 17, 2001), it was "agreed that the Fund
has an important role to play in protecting the integrity of the international financial system,
including through efforts to combat money laundering." 7 The term "integrity" is worth
16. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).

17. Available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2001/pnO141.htm.
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noting as it has two possible meanings. It may refer to the moral integrity of the financial
system (i.e., avoiding its use for the benefit of criminals, which would include not only the
laundering of money illegally acquired or saved (tax evasion) but also the financing with
legally acquired money of criminal activities, such as terrorism). Alternatively, it may refer
to its financial integrity (i.e., avoiding its use for transactions that may have a destabilizing
effect on the system itself). Also worth noting is the absence of a definition of money
laundering, probably because there are different definitions in different countries. (N.B.
The same is true for the definition of terrorism.)
With respect to activities other than technical assistance, it was "generally agreed that
the Fund should.., include anti-money laundering concerns in its surveillance and other
operational activities when macroeconomic relevant." 8 However, with respect to the adoption of anti-money laundering measures for the benefit of other countries, there was no
consensus: "A number of Directors considered that the cross-border implications of money
laundering should be raised during Article IV consultations, even if it is not macroeconomic
relevant for the member but when it had significant externalities for other countries." 19 On
the extent of the Fund's contribution to money laundering, it was "confirmed that it would
not be appropriate for the Fund to become involved in law enforcement activities." 0
The approach taken by the Fund in this decision is that money laundering by itself has
negative economic effects. Another approach would be to recognize the even more harmful
economic effects of large-scale crime, and particularly organized crime, and that the proceeds of those activities can be used not only to expand their scope but also to corrupt a
country's governance structures, thus undermining its capacity to implement sound economic and financial policies.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this discussion is that conclusions are reached on
the scope of surveillance without referring to the provisions of Article IV. In the Acting
Chairman's summing up, the word obligation does not even appear at all. This avoidance
of legal terminology in a discussion on surveillance reflects the ambiguity of its legal nature,
not in the Articles of Agreement, but in the practice of the Fund.
2. The Legal Nature of Surveillance
There is sometimes confusion between soft obligations and soft law. A soft obligation is
an obligation that does not require the achievement of a particular objective or even the
exercise of best efforts or due diligence, but only a reasonable effort in light of all relevant
circumstances. In contrast, soft law means that there is no obligation at all.
Article IV, section 1 offers a good example of different types of obligations. The first two
specific obligations (economic and financial policies or conditions) are undeniably soft: a
member must "endeavor to direct its economic and financial policies toward the objective
of fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability, with due regard to its
circumstances;" 2' it must also "seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying
economic and financial conditions and a monetary system that does not produce erratic
disruptions. ' 22The other two obligations (exchange rates and exchange policies) are hard

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. IV, § 1(i).
Id. art. IV, § l(ii).
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obligations: a member must "avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an
unfair competitive advantage over other members;"23 it must also "follow exchange policies
compatible with the undertakings under this Section." 4 The last obligation is formulated
in terms that give great latitude to the Fund, which does not change the nature of the
obligation but makes its scope rather uncertain.
Where there is an obligation, there can be a sanction. The sanctions listed in
Article XjVI could apply to a member that fails to meet any of its obligations under
Article r. Even if no sanction is applied, the Managing Director is required to report to
the Executive Board any case in which it appears to him that a member is not fulfilling its
obligations under the Articles."
In fact, there has not been a single instance in which sanctions have been applied or a
report has been made for breach of obligation under Article W.
This de facto transformation of Article IV, section 1 into a soft law provision is reflected
in the description of Article IV consultations with members as "policy advice" provided by
the Fund to each member or "policy dialogue" between each member and the Fund. More
and more, surveillance and technical assistance are seen as two closely related activities,
even though surveillance is mandatory for the Fund and its members while technical assistance is optional for both. For instance, it has been suggested that compliance with some
standards should be an optional element of the surveillance process at the discretion ofeach
member. This mixture of technical assistance and surveillance would have the advantage of
securing gradual acceptance of standards by all members, but would also blur the distinction
between the two activities.
In some cases, Article IV consultations offer an opportunity to exercise peer pressure
without asserting the existence of an obligation under Article I. This is particularly true
when the policies of a member are seen as harmful to the interests of others. The staff may
then be instructed, on the occasion of its Article IV consultation discussions with the member's authorities, to raise those issues and elicit the authorities' intentions; the staff's findings are then reported to the Executive Board and discussed by the Executive Directors.
An even more interesting development is the reversal that is taking place between the
two types of obligations under Article IV, section 1.The hard obligations on exchange rate
policies were initially expected to take center stage in consultations with members while
obligations relating to domestic policies were seen as less central to the process. In practice,
the opposite has happened. Consultations focus on domestic (monetary, fiscal, structural)
and usually trade policies, with only a broad appraisal by the Fund of exchange rate policies
as such. In contrast, the exchange rate relationships among the currencies of G-7 countries
are discussed regularly and sometimes extensively within that group.
One particular reason for this evolution is that, as the Fund becomes a larger institution,
the confidentiality of discussions on exchange rate policies, which are by definition sensitive,
can no longer be assured. Moreover, the demands for greater transparency from the Fund
tend to relegate candid discussions on such topics to other more limited fora.

23. Id.art. IV,§ l(iii).
24. Id.art. IV, § l(iv).
25. By-Laws, Rules and Regulations of the International Monetary Fund, Fifty-Eighth Issue, May 2001,
Rule K-I, availabk at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bl/blcon.hn.
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With this change in focus, consultations on domestic policies tend to expand and cover
more and more ground. For instance, the principles adopted by the Fund for the guidance
of its members must respect their political and social policies26 but labor policies have an
impact on economic performance and the 1977 document "Surveillance Over Exchange
Rate Policies" (quoted above) mentions "reasonable levels of employment" as relevant to
the Fund's surveillance. In practice, labor policies are now included in Article IV discussions. Another example is the emphasis on good governance in domestic policies, with
particular attention being given to corruption. More recently, the scope of Fund surveillance
has been extended to money laundering, at least when it is "macroeconomic relevant."
As the nature of surveillance is perceived less as compliance with obligations than the
exercise of peer pressure, the perception of surveillance as an element of Fund jurisdiction
tends to fade. If surveillance is not related to obligations under the Articles, why not expand
it to cover standards developed outside the Fund (e.g., by other intergovernmental organizations, such as the OECD, or working groups of national officials, such as the Financial
Action Task Force and the Financial Stability Forum, or private associations)? A lot of good
work is being done outside the Fund and the Fund would simply have to assess each member's
observance of those standards. Similarly, why should surveillance be a privilege of the Fund?
Why not involve the World Bank and its vast staff and expertise in the consultation process?
The difficulty with this approach is that it is no longer surveillance. Members have an
obligation under the Fund's Articles to cooperate with the Fund, to provide information
to the Fund, and to perform the other obligations specified in the Fund's Articles. This
does not include an obligation to cooperate with other organizations or private associations,
to provide them with information, or to comply with standards set by them. All this can
only be done on a voluntary basis (perhaps reluctantly and under the threat of being blacklisted or subjected to retaliatory measures by other countries) and failure to comply cannot
give rise to sanctions under the Articles. However, as Article IV is seen as soft law, the
difference with other forms of peer pressure is less and less perceptible and this penumbra
facilitates both an expansion and a dilution of Fund surveillance.
In order to bridge the gap between technical assistance and surveillance while maintaining
the distinction, a new instrument has been developed by the Fund. The Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) are prepared by Fund and World Bank staff at
the request of a member to assess its compliance with standards and codes. The results are
reflected in the Article IV consultation report concerning the member.
II. Financial Aspects
Since the second amendment of the Fund's Articles (1978), a major distinction-not
always fully understood-has been made between two types of financing by the Fund.
(a) The general resources (held in the General Resources Account (GRA)) of the Fund
are available to assist all members, on a uniform basis, under policies adopted by the Fund,
to help them resolve their balance of payments problems in accordance with the provisions,
and in particular the purposes, of the Fund. There are different policies for different types
of balance of payments problems, but no other distinction among members (e.g., between
developing and developed countries) is permitted.

26. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. IV,§ 3(b).
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This financial assistance takes the form of bilateral exchange transactions between the
Fund, which provides foreign exchange or special drawing rights, and a member, which
provides an equivalent amount of its currency. This sale of foreign exchange must be reversed by the member within a specified period, which may vary depending on the policy
under which the assistance was granted (e.g., three to five years). The member pays a
transaction charge at the time of the transaction and a periodic charge until the transaction
is reversed.
A recent review of the Fund's policies on the use of its general resources has reduced the
number of policies, adjusted their respective costs for users of Fund resources, and generalized the system of repurchase expectations, which tends to accelerate the reversal of transactions without making it mandatory. Long-term financing by the Fund had been criticized
by some governments as making the Fund less a monetary than a development agency. A
shortening of repurchase obligations would have required an 85 percent majority of the
total voting power, which could not be obtained. The adoption of a repurchase expectation,
by a majority of the votes cast, was the final compromise.
(b) Before the second amendment, the Fund had been receiving gold from most Fund
members in payment of their quota subscriptions. This gold, which was the property of the
Fund, had been received and accounted for at the official price (SDR 35 per ounce), but
market prices were much higher. Therefore, it was agreed that except for an amount of
gold to be sold to members at the official price, the Fund would be allowed to sell gold at
market prices and could decide to use the profits to assist developing countries. Accordingly,
profits on sales of gold that was held by the Fund at the time of the second amendment
may be transferred to the Special Disbursement Account (SDA) and used to provide balance
of payments assistance consistent with the purposes of the Fund to developing countries,
taking into account their per capita incomes. One difference between general and SDA
resources is that the concept of balance of payments problem is broader in the context of
the SDA because it takes into account the external deficit that may be created by the recipient country's development strategy. Another difference is that the Special Disbursement
Account does not engage in reversible exchange transactions but may extend either loans
or grants. These resources, combined with voluntary contributions made by a number of
Fund members, are now being used in the context of two facilities for developing countries:
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, which extends long-term concessional loans,
and the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, which provides grants to help recipient
countries discharge all or part of their indebtedness to the Fund.
Although the technique, the cost and the beneficiaries of the two types of assistance differ,
both types of assistance must be consistent with the Fund's purposes, which implies that
the assistance is of a monetary rather than developmental nature. Also, both types of assistance are subject to conditions, though the nature and scope of Fund conditionality may
vary because the problems to be addressed are not necessarily the same.
A. THE PURPOSES OF

THE FUND's FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

1. F.ristence of a Balance of Payments Problem
The purposes of the Fund's financial assistance are derived from the purposes of the
Fund, as set forth in Article I. The most direct connection is found in the fifth purpose,
which is "[to] give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opWINTER 2001
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portunity to cover maladjustments in their balance of payments, without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity."" (N.B. the references to "general
resources" and "adequate safeguards" mean that the general resources may not be used in
grants; this limitation does not apply to resources in the Special Disbursement Account.)
To give effect to this purpose, Article V, section 3(a) requires the Fund to adopt policies
on the use of its general resources for balance of payments problems: "The Fund shall adopt
policies on the use of its general resources, including policies on stand-by or similar arrangements, and may adopt special policies for special balance of payments problems, that
will assist members to solve their balance of payments problems in a manner consistent
with the provisions of this Agreement and that will establish adequate safeguards for the
temporary use of the general resources of the Fund.""
A balance of payments problem may have different causes but will manifest itself through
a balance of payments deficit and/or low reserves (foreign exchange, gold, special drawing
rights, reserve position in the Fund). The Fund's assistance will be used to finance the
deficit and/or strengthen the country's reserves.
Therefore, when requesting a purchase, a member must represent "that it has a need to
make the purchase because of its balance of payments or its reserve position or developments in its reserves."' 9 This means that a balance of payments deficit may not be the cause
of the member's need for assistance; low reserves could also justify a request, but it is still
the sign of a weak external position, and it is included in the broad concept of "balance of
payments problem."
From these provisions it is clear that Fund resources cannot be used for purposes other
than corrections in members' balances of payments; they cannot be used to finance a budget
deficit or development projects. An interpretation of the Articles adopted by the Fund in
the first year of its existence was very explicit on this point: "authority to use the resources
of the Fund is limited to use in accordance with its purposes to give temporary assistance
in financing balance of payments deficit on current account for monetary stabilization."o
A few years later it was clarified that this interpretation did not preclude the use of the
Fund's resources for capital transfers to the limited extent provided in Article VI, but the
principle remained that Fund resources were available only for balance of payments assistance. Similarly, when the second amendment recognized that financing by the Fund would
be available not only for a balance of payments deficit but also to strengthen reserves, this
was still regarded as balance of payments assistance because reserves are needed to meet a
potential external deficit.
2. Growth as a Purpose of Fund Assistance
Since corrections in a country's balance of payments will allow the resumption ofgrowthoriented policies, it is sometimes said that growth is one of the purposes of the Fund's
financial assistance. This would mean that the Fund should make growth a condition of its
assistance and provide the necessary financing. The justifications for asserting that growth
is one of the Fund's purposes are usually not offered, probably because growth is seen as

27. Id. art. I(v).
28. Id. art. V, § 3(a).
29. Id. art. V, § 3(b)(ii) (N.B. The third concept, "developments in reserves," does not correspond to a
balance of payments problem but to an inadequacy in the composition of reserves.).
30. Decision No. 71-2, Sept. 26, 1946, in Selected Decisions, supra note 15, at 128.
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such a desirable objective that it need not be made explicit in a legal provision. Sometimes,
a justification is provided by pointing out that growth is mentioned both in Article 1(ii) and
in Article IV, section 1. Neither of these references, however, is relevant.
The growth mentioned in Article I(ii) is the growth of international trade, not the domestic economic growth of recipients of Fund resources. The whole sentence reads as
follows: "To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to
contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and
real income and to the development of the productive resources of all members as primary
objectives of economic policy."3 The expression "to contribute thereby" shows that high
levels of employment, real income, etc. are a mediate effect of the achievement of the Fund's
second purpose, which is "to facilitate" trade expansion, but it is not part of the purposes
of the Fund.
The term "growth" appears twice in Article IV, section 1, but this provision deals with
surveillance, not with the Fund's financial assistance. Moreover, growth is not mentioned in
the preamble of section 1 as a purpose of the Fund itself. Nor is there a direct relationship
between growth and the international monetary system. The "essential purpose" of the international monetary system is only to provide a "framework" that sustains economic growth.
In section 1(i), growth is mentioned again, but only in the definition of members' obligations and with a number of qualifications, and in any case not as a purpose of the Fund. What
Article I(ii) and Article IV, section l(i) have in common is that "the development of the productive resources" and "orderly economic growth" are really the objectives of the members'
own policies."' Under Article I(ii), it is for the members to decide whether and how they want
their economies to grow and in Article IV, section I(i) it is for the members to pursue "the
objective of fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability."33
Although legally incorrect, the reference to growth as a purpose of the Fund's financial
assistance is understandable for political reasons. Correcting maladjustments is not glamorous and is often associated with austerity and unemployment. Growth as a final objective
of adjustment policies has greater appeal and may signal the desire to resume growth as
soon as possible. The legal and the political uses of the term are not completely incompatible. A railroad engineer would say that the purpose of a railroad line is to transport
passengers and goods from one place to another. A minister may prefer to say that the
purpose is to create jobs and develop the country's economy. The word purpose has different meanings in different contexts.
3. The Fund as Lender of Last Resort
In recent discussions on the financial role of the Fund, various suggestions were made
to make the Fund less a primary lender to countries than a lender of last resort.
In a national system, the lender of last resort is the central bank. Its function is to provide
liquidity to primary lenders (commercial banks) but not to rescue them when they are
insolvent, unless there is a systemic risk (failure of the banking system).
One suggestion was to limit each member's access to Fund resources to a low level in
terms of quota and to create a special facility, with no specified access limit, for cases of
systemic crises. A systemic crisis is not defined by its impact on the country requesting

31. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1(ii).
32. Id. arts. I(ii) and IV, § I(i).
33. Id. art. IV, § I(i).
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financial assistance but by its impact on other countries. Therefore, a country creating a
systemic risk would receive more financing to stem the risk of contagion to other countries.
This raises a legal issue. Since access to Fund resources is determined by a country's own
balance of payments problem, the impact of a crisis on other countries is not a relevant
consideration for assessing the member's need for assistance. As systemic crises would only
originate in major countries, other countries facing a problem of the same magnitude (in
terms of their quotas) would not qualify for the same level of assistance. This would be
contrary to the principle of uniform treatment. The proposal was not pursued.
Another proposal was that countries that have access to capital markets should not have
access to Fund resources. The argument was that, since they can finance their own external
deficit, they have no balance of payments problem. Two objections were made to this proposal. The first one was that it was based on a misunderstanding of what constitutes a
balance of payments problem. Under the Fund's definition, external borrowing, by a government or a central bank, to finance external payments or increase reserves does not eliminate but usually confirms the existence of a balance of payments problem. Such a problem
exists whenever official action is needed to acquire foreign exchange. The second objection
was that access to capital markets would not necessarily allow the recipient country to
resolve its balance of payments problem in a manner consistent with the purposes of the
Fund: the amount, cost, and duration of the loans might not allow the country to avoid
imposing exchange or trade restrictions or other harmful measures, which Fund financing
would enable it not to take. This proposal also was abandoned.
4. The MoralHazard Lue
One of the concerns about the bailout of commercial banks by central banks is the risk
of moral hazard; a bailout may create an incentive for lax management by other banks.
More generally, any systematic use of public money to rescue private debtors creates a moral
hazard for other debtors and their creditors as imprudent lending becomes risk-free.
The same argument has been used in the Fund, probably because of the analogy with
national lenders of last resort. However, the Fund is not a central bank. Its function is to
help countries facing a balance of payments problem. The moral hazard argument, if carried
to its full logic, would put the Fund in the situation of a hospital turning down incoming
patients, including those with contagious diseases, to encourage recourse to preventive
medicine. Not only would the Fund fail in its duty to assist members in difficulties, but
also this failure would adversely affect other countries, as the ailing member would probably
resort to measures "destructive of national or international prosperity." 34 At least between
the Fund and the debtor country, the moral hazard argument has no place.
Between the Fund and the country's creditors the moral hazard argument is relevant.
The problem, however, is that limiting access to Fund resources in order to avoid bailing
out irresponsible lenders would first hurt the country itself.
5. Safeguard of Fund Resources
There is no doubt that the Fund's resources are limited and must be safeguarded. Nor is
there any doubt that the Fund is not allowed to use its resources to finance large or sustained
outflows of capital. Therefore, a degree of participation of public and private creditors in the

34. Id. art. 1(v).
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financing of Fund-supported programs is necessary. The contribution of official creditors
through rescheduling and refinancing of their claims takes place under the auspices of the
Paris Club. There is a similar process for commercial creditor banks in the London Club.
There is no equivalent process, except on a case-by-case basis, for bondholders.
Initially, the Fund's policy was not to "lend into arrears": no financing was made available
until the debtor country had reached agreement with its public and private creditors. The
present practice is for the Fund to provide financing even before an agreement is reached
with private creditors if prompt Fund support is considered essential for the successful
implementation of the member's adjustment program and the member is making a good
faith effort toward a collaborative agreement with the creditors. During the interim period,
a participation of the private sector in the financing of the program-through rollovers or
reductions in the service of the debt-may be necessary for the program to succeed. In
contrast with other (public or private) creditors, the Fund is regarded as a preferred creditor,
whose claims are not subject to rescheduling. This special status finds its origin in the
practice of the Paris Club not to include the Fund and the World Bank in their negotiations
with debtor countries, thus allowing them to stay out of the rescheduling process.
B. FutnD

CONDMONALITY

The expression Fund conditionality is more often used than defined. In one sense, Fund
conditionality began with the Fund itself because the original Articles of Agreement set
forth a number of conditions for access to Fund resources. However, what may be regarded
as the beginning of conditionality by the Fund as the term is now understood was the
decision of 1948 recognizing the power of the Fund to add conditions to those set forth in
the Articles. Since then, the techniques of Fund conditionality have evolved considerably,
with a constant tension between the need for users of Fund resources to know their rights
with reasonable certainty and the desire of the Fund's organs to retain as much discretion
as possible; this evolution may even be described as a pendulum oscillating between certainty and discretion. Another aspect of Fund conditionality has been the gradual expansion
of its scope from macroeconomic to structural adjustment.
1. The Origin of Conditionality
Under the original Articles of Agreement, a member was entitled to use the Fund's
resources if it met the conditions specified in the Articles." If these conditions were not
met, the member had no entitlement, but the Fund could waive the conditions prescribed
by the Articles.
One of the conditions under the former Article V, section 3 was that the member "represent" that the currency it wanted to purchase was "presently needed for making in that
currency payments which are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement." 36 Since the
rate of charge paid to the Fund was rather low, there was a risk that some members would
purchase currencies from the Fund and invest them for profit. Moreover, after a few years
it became clear that most requests were for purchases of U.S. dollars, which created a
different risk, namely, that the Fund, acting under Article VII, section 3, would declare the

35. Former art. V, § 3(a).
36. Id. art. V, § 3.
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U.S. dollar a scarce currency, which would have allowed other members to restrict exchange
operations in U.S. dollars in their territories.
On March 10, 1948, the Fund adopted an interpretation of Article V, section 3(a), which
clarified and substantially limited the right of members to purchase currencies from the Fund.
It was decided that the word "represents" means "declares." In the same decision, however,
the Fund took the view that it had the power, for good reason, to challenge the correctness
of a member's declaration, for instance, because in the judgment of the Fund the currency
was not "presently needed" or not needed for payment "in that currency" or the payment
was not "consistent with the provisions of this Agreement." 37 In such cases, the member's
request could be postponed, rejected or made subject to conditions. This was the first assertion
of the Fund's power to add conditions to those set forth in the Articles.
This interpretation created great uncertainty. Members were reluctant to request purchases without the assurance that the request would be met. A new instrument was therefore
invented to combine conditionality and certainty. In 1953, a policy of the Fund on standby arrangements provided that "a member having a stand-by arrangement will have the
3
right to engage in transactions without further review by the Fund." " This meant that
requests for purchases would be met to the extent and subject to the conditions specified
in the stand-by arrangement.
The stand-by arrangement is a creation of the Fund's practice. Later, other types of
arrangements have been developed for special policies (extended arrangements and PRGF
arrangements) but they are based on the same model.
The invention of the stand-by arrangement was designed to give greater confidence to
members, not to preclude the possibility of requests for purchases outside an arrangement
("outright purchases"). Gradually, however, arrangements have tended to become the preferred instrument for access to Fund resources. Under the credit tranche policies, both
outright purchases and stand-by arrangements can be used, but in practice access beyond
the first credit tranche is under an arrangement. In the Extended Fund Facility, the Supplemental Reserve Facility and the Contingent Credit Lines, assistance is provided under
a stand-by arrangement or (except for the CCL) an extended arrangement. In the Compensatory Financing Facility, outright purchases are used, but higher access is possible if
there is a parallel stand-by or extended arrangement. In the Emergency Assistance Facility,
outright purchases are used. In the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, loans are extended under arrangements.
The existence of stand-by and similar arrangements and their role in Fund conditionality
are now explicitly acknowledged in the new Article V, section 3(a), as modified by the second
amendment. The concept of stand-by arrangement is now defined in Article XXX(b):
"Stand-by arrangement means a decision of the Fund by which a member is assured that
it will be able to make purchases from the General Resources Account in accordance with
the terms of the decision during a specified period and up to a specified amount." In addition, the 1979 Guidelines on Fund conditionality clarify the legal nature of stand-by
arrangements: they "are not international agreements and therefore language having a con39
tractual connotation will be avoided in stand-by arrangements and letters of intent."

37. Decision No. 284-4, Mar. 10, 1948, in Selected Decisions, supra note 15, at 129.
38. Decision No. 270-(53/95), Dec. 23, 1953, para. 4,in Selected Decisions, supra note 15, at 146, 147.
39. Decision No. 6056-(79/38), Mar. 2, 1979, para. 3, in Selected Decisions, supra note 15, at 149.
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Extended arrangements are not defined in the Articles but they are regarded as "similar"
to stand-by arrangements for purposes of Article V, section 3(a). There are certain differences between the two instruments because they are used under different policies, but the
source and nature of the commitment are the same as for stand-by arrangements. Therefore,
the same definition applies to them and their legal nature is identical.
The same can be said of arrangements under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
(formerly the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, which itself followed the Structured
Adjustment Facility). The only difference is that financing under a stand-by or extended
arrangement takes the form of a sale of currency because this is the technique in the General
Resources Account, while financing under a PRGF (or ESAF or SAF) arrangement takes
the form of loans because this is the technique in administered accounts (or in the Special
Disbursement Account).
Because of this difference, some have argued that SAF/ESAF (or now PRGF) arrangements are of a contractual nature. The implicit reason seems to be that a stand-by arrangement is a unilateral decision of the Fund because it is a commitment to sell currency, while
a PRGF arrangement is a contract because it is a commitment to lend currency. This
analysis has no merit. If a commitment to sell may be unilateral, the same is true of a
commitment to lend. In any case, the commitment itself is neither a sale nor a loan.
2. Techniques of Conditionality
Broadly understood, Fund conditionality consists of three layers of conditions.
(a) The first layer is found in the Articles of Agreement and the policies adopted by the
Fund under the Articles. In the GRA, Article V, section 3(a) requires the adoption of general
policies applicable to all types of balance of payments problems (the credit tranche policies)
and authorizes the adoption of special policies for special balances of payments problems
(e.g., the Extended Fund Facility). These special policies may specify not only different
conditions but also different levels of access, maturities and charges. Both general and
special policies must "assist members to solve their balance of payments problems in a
manner consistent with the provisions of this Agreement and... will establish adequate
safeguards for the temporary use of the general resources of the Fund."(b) The second layer is found in stand-by and other arrangements. Each arrangement is
a self-contained document. All the conditions, but only the conditions specified in the
arrangement, apply to the assistance provided under that arrangement. There are essentially
two types of conditions: performance criteria and reviews.
Performance criteria are specified in the arrangement when approved or reviewed by the
Executive Board. They are objectively defined and their implementation is monitored by
the staff. If the relevant criteria are met and no review is required for a particular purchase,
the purchase may be made without having to request Executive Board approval; the request
for the purchase could not even be denied on the grounds that the member has no balance
of payments need and that its representation of need (required for the purchase) is demonstrably false. The Fund could only take action after the fact by requesting a reversal of the
transaction. 41 If a performance criterion is not met, the purchase may not be made unless
the Executive Board grants a waiver of applicability or for nonobservance of the performance criterion. Sometimes, however, a performance criterion appears to have been met

40. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. V, § 3(a).
41. Id. art. V, § 5.
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but the information provided by the member turns out to be incorrect; in such cases of
misreporting, the member will be called upon to reverse the transaction unless the Fund
grants a waiver.
Performance criteria are conditions, not obligations. Failure to meet a performance
criterion by a member is not a breach of obligation and does not give rise to sanctions
under the Fund's Articles. The only exception would be when the performance criterion is
nothing but the observance of an obligation under the Articles (e.g., non-imposition of
restrictions on current payments). As they are specified by the Fund pursuant to the Articles
and policies of the Fund, performance criteria must be consistent with the Articles and the
relevant policies.
Reviews are conducted by the Executive Board. For a long period, their sole purpose was
to set performance criteria for the period not covered by the performance criteria specified
at an earlier date. Now, reviews are part of Fund conditionality. Non-completion of a review
for performance regarded as unsatisfactory by the Executive Board suspends further access
to Fund assistance under the arrangement. In some arrangements, monthly reviews are
required, which substantially limits the effectiveness of the assurance the arrangement is
supposed to provide to the member.
In addition to performance criteria and reviews, there may be conditions relating to the
occurrence of particular events. For instance, under the Contingent Credit Lines, the
Fund's commitment under the arrangement can only be activated in the event of contagion
("adverse developments in international capital markets consequent upon developments in
other countries" 42 ).
(c) The third layer of Fund conditionality is based on the role played by the Managing
Director and the staff in conducting discussions with members requesting access to Fund
resources and in making recommendations to the Executive Board for the approval of an
arrangement or the completion of a review. These recommendations are based on the taking
of prior actions or the meeting of benchmarks, which have been communicated to the
member by the staff as conditions or relevant considerations for the Managing Director's
recommendations to the Executive Board. These prior actions and benchmarks are not
conditions in the same sense as performance criteria since they are not formulated by the
Executive Board in the arrangement, and failure to meet them does not automatically suspend the Fund's assistance or require a waiver. They may, however, affect the member's
access to Fund resources because the Managing Director's recommendations carry particular weight with the Executive Board. As they are formulated by staff and management in
the performance of their duties as Fund officials, these prior actions and benchmarks must,
like performance criteria, be consistent with the Articles of Agreement and the relevant
policies of the Fund.
It may be noted that, in addition to the conditions specified in the arrangement and the
prior actions and benchmarks specified by the staff, a member may state its intention to
take other measures that will be part of the economic and financial program for which Fund
support is requested. These measures are not part of Fund conditionality.

42. Decision No. 11627-(97/123) SRF, as amended on Apr. 23, 1999, para. 15, in Selected Decisions, supra
note 15, at 233, 237.
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3. Scope of Conditionality
When conditionality under stand-by arrangements was invented, the scope of Fund
conditionality was limited essentially to macroeconomic policies (budget, credit, external
debt, and reserves) and compliance with obligations under the Articles (avoidance of exchange restrictions). The 1979 guidelines on stand-by arrangements (in the credit tranches)
still stated:
Performance criteria will normally be confined to (i) macroeconomic variables, and (ii) those
necessary to implement specific provisions of the Articles on policies adopted under them. Performance criteria may relate to other variables only in exceptional cases when they are essential
for the effectiveness of the member's program because of their macroeconomic impact.41
In contrast, the 1974 decision on extended arrangements (under the Extended Fund
Facility) emphasized the need for comprehensive programs "to correct structural imbalances in production, trade, and prices," which corresponded to a longer-term commitment
44
of resources by the Fund to help correct structural maladjustment in production and trade.
Therefore, different conditionalities for different types of balance of payments problems
characterize the practice of the Fund. In fact, each special policy on the use of Fund resources requires its own type of conditionality. For instance, the Supplemental Reserve
Facility and the Contingent Credit Lines, although they share some common provisions,
are subject to very different types of conditionality because they correspond to different
balance of payments problems.
When designing its conditionality, the Fund is guided by two main considerations. The
first one is that the conditions must help the member to resolve its balance of payments
problem in a manner consistent with the purposes of the Fund while safeguarding the
Fund's resources. The other one is that the conditions are only those necessary to achieve
those objectives. As conditions affect a member's exercise of its sovereign powers, they must
be kept to the minimum necessary to achieve the objectives states by the Articles.
An example of this self-restraint may be found in the conclusions of a discussion in 1991
at the Executive Board on the treatment of military expenditure in Fund conditionality:
although a number of Executive Directors deplored the unproductive nature of military
expenditures, it was "agreed that data on military expenditures should not serve as the
basis for establishing performance criteria or similar conditions associated with Fund"4
supported programs. 1

Self-restraint is not easy to exercise in the face of a major financial crisis, particularly
when other Fund members see the crisis as a unique opportunity to impose the reforms
they have been advocating. In these circumstances, the member requesting Fund assistance
may wonder whether the reforms demanded by the Fund are really necessary for the resolution of its own problem or rather intended to satisfy the objectives of other countries.
Self-restraint is easier to observe when another organization takes responsibility for certain aspects of a program. For instance, when the same country turns to both the Fund and
the World Bank for assistance, it is possible to limit the scope of Fund conditionality to

43. Decision No. 6056-(79/38), Mar. 2, 1979, para. 9, in Selected Decisions, supra note 15, at 149, 150.
44. Decision No. 4377-(74/114), Sept. 13, 1974, Part IT,para. 1, in Selected Decisions, supra note 15, at 165,
166.
45. Concluding Remarks by the Acting Chairman, Military Expenditure and the Role of the Fund, Executive
Board Meeting 91/138, Oct. 2, 1991, in Sekcted Decisions, supra note 15, at 447, 448.
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macroeconomic measures and a few structural measures, leaving the major part of the
structural adjustment to the World Bank.
From a legal standpoint, the most difficult question is not whether a particular measure
is necessary or not, but rather whether it may be imposed without exceeding the limits set
by the Articles. In practice, the main criterion is consistency with the purposes of the Fund.
Those purposes are economic and financial; they are not political, which would exclude
political conditionality. These purposes include the facilitation ofinternational trade, which
would authorize trade liberalization, or at least the avoidance of trade restrictions for balance of payments reasons, as part of Fund conditionality. The Fund's purposes also include
the preservation of productive resources, which would include human resources (safety
nets, health, and education) and natural resources (environment). What is absent from the
Fund's purposes is the liberalization of capital movements, which is explicitly excluded from
the mandate of the Fund in Article VI. Therefore, this liberalization is outside of the
Fund's conditionality.
The duty to exercise self-restraint in the formulation of Fund conditionality and to observe the requirements of the Articles when deciding whether or not a particular condition
is within the Fund's mandate applies to the organs of the Fund. It does not apply to members
of the Fund. They are free to advocate changes in Fund conditionality as a vehicle for the
attainment of their own objectives. An example can be found in the U.S. legislation as
incorporated in Title 22 of the U.S. Code; these provisions often direct the Secretary of
the Treasury to instruct the U.S. Executive Director in the Fund to oppose Fund financing
for countries that do not meet specified conditions and to promote the inclusion in Fund
conditionality of certain objectives. (For a comprehensive review of the legislation and its
implementation, see the report ofJanuary 2001 of the U.S. General Accounting Office to
Congressional Committees on "Efforts to Advance U.S. Policies at the Fund," GAO 01214.) Although the U.S. Executive Director is an official of the Fund who is not legally
under the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury, the fact that the Secretary may terminate the U.S. Executive Director's appointment at any time is a strong incentive for
complying with those instructions. Other Executive Directors also receive instructions relating to Fund conditionality, usually from the executive branch rather than the legislature
of their constituents.

IMI. Institutional Aspects
A.

INTERNAL ASPECTS

1. Structure
Since the creation of the Fund, its internal structure has remained remarkably stable.
The Fund is an international financial institution whose members are independent states.
Each member is assigned a quota, which determines its voting rights (in addition to 250
basic votes allotted to each member), the size of its contribution to the Fund, and the extent
of its entitlement to use the Fund's resources. Uniformity of treatment in the Fund does
not mean equal access in absolute amounts to the Fund's resources but access in proportion
to quotas.
Each member appoints one Governor and the Board of Governors is the supreme organ
of the Fund. The members also appoint or elect Executive Directors. The members with
the five largest quotas elect one Executive Director each (United States, Japan, Germany,
United Kingdom, France). The other members elect the other Executive Directors who at
VOL. 35, NO. 4
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present number nineteen. Given the large number of members not appointing Executive
Directors (178), those members organize themselves into groups, each of which forms a
constituency to elect an Executive Director. However, three members have enough votes
to form single-country constituencies and elect three Executive Directors (China, Russia,
Saudi Arabia). The present total number of Executive Directors is twenty-four, but the
number of elected Directors is not fixed. The standard number of elected Directors under
the Articles is fifteen, but it may be increased or decreased by the Board of Governors; that
decision is made every two years, at the time of the election of Executive Directors and
requires an 85 percent majority of the total voting power. The Executive Board exercises
the powers delegated by the Board of Governors and those conferred directly by the Articles
of Agreement.
The Executive Directors elect a Managing Director who is the head of the staff. Therefore, the staff is under the authority of the Managing Director, not of the Executive Board.
The Board of Governors may create committees with advisory functions. In 1974, an
Interim Committee of the Board of Governors on the International Monetary System had
been established; it had the same number of members as the Executive Board and was
designated by the same constituencies as those that appoint or elect the Executive Directors.
In 1999, the Interim Committee was replaced by the International Monetary and Financial
Committee (IMFC) with the same composition as the Interim Committee but an expanded
mandate. It is supposed to supervise the adaptation and management not only of the international monetary system, which is referred to in the Fund's Articles, but also of the international financial system. Although this concept does not appear in the Fund's Articles and
is not defined in the resolution of the Board of Governors, its mention reflects the growing
interest of Fund members in ensuring an orderly conduct of international financial relations.
Financial markets are a major source of liquidity both for governments and for the private
sector. Hence, the emphasis that is now given in the work of the Fund on standards and
the prevention of financial abuse.
Consideration had been given to establishing the Council, a decision-making organ of
limited membership whose creation is authorized by the Fund's Articles, but this proposal
did not succeed. Instead, the IMFC, with advisory powers, was established.
2. Membership
Membership in the Fund is open to "countries." By countries the Fund understands
sovereign states. In order to be a member, a country need not have its own currency.
Some countries do not issue their own currency; this does not preclude them from being
members of the Fund. In that case they select another member's currency and use it as their
own in transactions with the Fund. The Fund's holdings acquired as a result of such transactions are accounted for separately from those acquired in transactions with the issuer of
the currency. Although a number of Fund members have joined monetary unions and share
common currencies, they do not share a common membership in the Fund. Each member
of a monetary union may join the Fund and is treated like any other member. For instance,
the members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union are all members of the
Fund. The Union is not a member of the Fund because it is not a country. The members
of a monetary union remain subject to all their obligations under the Articles, including
those relating to exchange rates.
This issue came up recently after the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU)
with a common single currency and a common central bank. The view was taken by some
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that the Union should replace its members in the Fund. This view was not accepted by the
Fund. Instead, the European Central Bank was allowed to become an observer at meetings
of the Fund's Executive Board on issues within its competence.
It is, of course, possible for members of a monetary union to form a constituency and
elect the same Executive Director to the Executive Board, but only if they are not among
the countries that have the five largest quotas because those countries have to appoint an
Executive Director. For instance, France and Germany have to appoint their own Executive
Directors. Other members of EMU could form one or more EMU constituencies to elect
one or more Executive Directors but so far they have chosen to remain in constituencies
with non-EMU members.
It is rather superficial to believe that membership in the Fund should be based on the
issuance of a separate currency. The Fund is a monetary institution but its surveillance
applies to economic and financial policies, including fiscal policies, which are outside the
scope of a monetary union. Fund conditionality also covers a broad range of issues, again
far beyond monetary policies. Moreover, a country that does not issue its own currency or
participates in a monetary union may face a balance of payments problem; its membership
in a monetary union would not deprive it of its access to Fund resources.
3. Voting Powers
The Fund was established as a cooperative in which each member may, in case of need,
receive assistance from the Fund. Therefore, all members are supposed to share a common
interest in the design of Fund conditionality and other activities of the Fund. However,
reality is more complex. During the first years of the Fund, it became clear that certain
countries (the United States at first) were mainly providers of assistance through the Fund
while others were mainly recipients of this assistance. Once countries see themselves as
creditors or debtors, they tend to have a polarized view of financial assistance. As developed
countries have "graduated" from Fund assistance, this assistance is seen now as benefiting
mostly developing or middle-income countries. In discussions on the design of Fund facilities, "creditor countries" may argue for higher costs and shorter maturities of Fund
assistance against "debtor countries," which want to preserve the status quo. The size of
Fund assistance is also a controversial issue, as well as the extent of Fund conditionality,
where "creditor" and "debtor" countries often take opposite views. Although this polarization is somewhat mitigated by the existence of mixed constituencies in which developed
and developing countries elect the same Executive Directors, positions taken in the Executive Board tend to reflect a division between supporters of the views of developed countries
versus those of developing countries.
Some developing countries have proposed a reallocation of voting powers that would
strengthen their role in the Fund's decision making-process. Various factors could be considered: more basic votes for each member; additional votes based on the size of a country's
population; and more votes for poorer countries (in terms of per capita income). No decision has been taken. Such changes would require an amendment of the Articles.
Another issue is the requirement in the Fund's Articles of a special majority for many
decisions: 70 or 85 percent of the total voting power. Those majorities give a de facto veto
to countries with large quotas; for instance, with more than 15 percent of the total voting
power, the United States can veto a number of major decisions. Conversely, groups of
smaller countries may unite to veto those decisions. These special majorities explain the
need in many cases for reaching a consensus on a compromise between conflicting views.
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4. Transparency and Accountability
(a) There have been complaints about the lack of transparency of the Fund's activities,
particularly in the context of its financial assistance and surveillance. Decisions of the Fund
either of a general or of a country-specific nature may be published and the Fund has
adopted policies to expand the scope of such publications. In addition, the Executive Board
often authorizes the publication of papers prepared by the staff for consideration by the
Board. A decision of January 4, 2001, has codified the Fund's publication policies. For
country-specific documents, the consent of the member is required.
The Fund's latitude in adopting publication policies is limited by three considerations.
The first one is of a legal nature. A member's letter of intent requesting financial assistance
and describing its program is a document of the member and can only be published by the
member or with its consent. The same is true of any documents or information communicated to the Fund on a confidential basis. Therefore, the Fund can only encourage but
cannot require the publication of those documents or data. The trend is toward more
transparency in that respect. The second consideration is also of a legal nature. Under
Article XII, section 8, the Fund's (i.e., the Executive Board's) assessment of a member's
situation and policies-particularly in the context of surveillance-may be communicated
informally to the member but may not be published by the Fund without the consent of
the member. (N.B. This condition would not apply if the Fund found that the member's
policies tended "to produce a serious disequilibrium in the balance of payments of members" but such a finding has never been made.) More and more this consent is granted by
the member concerned. The third consideration is of a policy nature. A report by Fund
staff on a member's situation and policies, though not expressing the official views of the
organization, may be mistakenly seen as an informal expression of such views. Therefore,
the Fund will not publish the report without the consent of the member.
(b) The Fund is accountable to its members and the Executive Board is accountable to
the Board of Governors. However, accountability of the Fund to the public is not required
by the Articles. Some organizations have created a system of independent evaluation whose
results are made public. The World Bank has created an Inspection Panel. In the Fund, it
has now been decided to establish an Independent Evaluation Office. Its director has been
appointed by the Executive Board. The Evaluation Office will conduct assessments of the
Fund's activities. These assessments can be made public.
B.

RELATIONs WITH OTHER ORGANIzATIONS

1. Principles
The Fund is required by its Articles to cooperate within the terms of its Articles with
any general international organization (i.e., the United Nations) and with public international organizations having specialized responsibilities in related fields.- This requirement
is qualified: the Fund can only cooperate within its mandate; it may not undertake to perform functions not authorized by its Articles, unless the necessary amendments of the Articles are first adopted by its membership. Demands on the Fund to give effect to recommendations of other organizations can only be met if the actions to be taken are consistent
with the Articles.

46. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. X.
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The condition of consistency with the Articles is essential. The Fund has not been established and endowed with resources to become an agent of other organizations. It is
incumbent upon the organs of the Fund to make sure, regardless of the pressures exercised
by governments, that this condition is observed. The fact that there is often support for
using the Fund as an enforcer of other treaties, does not make those treaties part of the
Fund's Articles.
For instance, it is sometimes stated that the Fund is bound by the provisions of the
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted in 1966 under the auspices of
the United Nations and entered into force in 1976. There is no doubt that, in the exercise
of its mandate, considerations that led to the adoption of the Covenant should also guide
the Fund. Specifically, the reference in Article I(v) to the Fund's financial assistance being
made available to provide its members "with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their
balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international
prosperity"47 means that the economic and social welfare of its members must be a key
consideration in the Fund's decision. However, this does not mean that only the welfare of
the recipient country should be considered. Otherwise, international prosperity could suffer. Nor does it mean that the Fund can ignore the various limitations imposed by its Articles
of Agreement. For example, the Fund can only provide financial assistance for balance of
payments problems. On the more fundamental issue, which is whether the Fund is legally
bound by the provisions of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
answer is that the Covenant does not apply to the Fund for three reasons. First, the Fund
is not a party to the Covenant. Second, the obligations imposed by the Covenant apply
only to states, not to international organizations. Third, the Covenant itself explicitly recognizes, in its Article 24, that "[n]othing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as
impairing the provisions ...of the constitutions of the specialized agencies which define
the respective responsibilities ... of the specialized agencies in regard to the matters dealt
with in the present Covenant." '
2. BilateralAgreements
A number of cooperation agreements have been entered into by the Fund with other
international organizations.
A 1947 agreement with the United Nations (U.N.) governs the relations between the
Fund and the U.N.49 This agreement recognizes the Fund as a specialized agency within
the meaning of the U.N. Charter (Article 57). That does not mean that the Fund has
become an agency of the United Nations; the term agency does not connote any subordination of the Fund to the U.N. Article 1.2 of the Agreement is quite clear on this point:
"By reason of the nature of its international responsibilities and the terms of its Articles of
Agreement, the Fund is, and is required to function as, an independent international organization." 0 The same Agreement recognizes that the Fund is not bound by the resolutions of the Security Council; the Fund only notes the obligatory effect on U.N. members

47. Id. art. I(v).
48. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21st Sess., Agenda
Item 62, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200 (1966).
49. Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, in Selected Decisions, supra
note 15, at 651.
50. Id. at 651.
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of Security Council resolutions adopted under Article 48, paragraph 2, of the U.N. Charter
and undertakes to pay due regard to resolutions of the Security Council under Articles 41
and 42 of the U.N Charter.5
In 1996, the Fund entered into a cooperation agreement with the World Trade Organization (WTO)5 2 One of the difficult issues during the negotiation of the agreement was
whether the Fund could communicate its findings concerning the consistency or inconsistency of a particular exchange measure with the Fund's Articles to a dispute settlement
panel of the WTO. This possibility was acknowledged in the agreement (paragraph 8).
However, when approving the agreement, the General Council of the WTO decided that
the Fund's communication would only be made to the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement
Body, who would inform the chairman of the panel of the availability of the communication.
This procedure created a risk that the panel would never see the Fund's communication, a
result inconsistent with the terms of the agreement. On the other hand, it was probable
that the panel would be informed by its chairman and would decide to see the Fund's
communication. Only experience would tell. Therefore, the Fund's Executive Board, made
aware of the General Council's decision, decided to approve the agreement "on the understanding that decisions taken by either party for the implementation of the Agreement
will not prevent the effective application of this Agreement in accordance with its provisions."" The terms "either party" rather than "the WTO" were used to soften the message.
The President of the World Bank and the Managing Director of the Fund have adopted
arrangements for cooperation at staff level between the two organizations. These arrangements have been communicated to the Executive Boards of both organizations. They delineate the areas of primary responsibility of the Fund and the Bank and recognize the
existence of common areas where their responsibilities overlap.
It has been suggested that the Fund should enter into a cooperation agreement with the
International Labour Organization for the exchange of information and with a view to
giving effect to core labor standards through Fund conditionality and surveillance.
3. MultilateralCooperation
A number of proposals have been made to increase multilateral cooperation among international organizations. Most of these proposals recognize the need to respect the mandate of each organization although, often implicit in the proposals, is the underlying assumption that closer cooperation will lead to a different reading of each organization's
charter, more accommodating to the views of others. Some of these proposals give preeminence to the U.N. over specialized agencies for a number of reasons. The most important is that the U.N. has a general mandate while specialized agencies have a limited mandate. Another reason is of a legal nature: under Article 103 of the U.N. Charter, obligations
of U.N. members under the Charter take precedence over their obligations under other
treaties. A third reason is more political: it is that the one country-one vote system of the
U.N. is claimed to be more democratic than the weighted voting system of international
financial institutions. Other proposals tend to emphasize cooperation among the specialized
agencies involved in trade, financial and labor issues. The U.N. has taken an initiative called

51.
15, at
52.
53.

See art. VI, para. 1, of the Agreement Between the U.N. and the Fund, in Selected Decisions, supra note
653.
See the text of the Agreement in Selected Decisions,supra note 15, at 905.
Decision No. 11381-(96/105), Nov. 25, 1996, in Selected Decisions, supra note 15, at 901.
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Financing for Development, which should result, in 2002, in concrete proposals for closer
cooperation within the U.N. system.

IV. Conclusion
What is the future of the Fund? Some suggestions have been made to revise its role as a
financial institution, while others question its very existence.
1. The suggestions concerning the financial role of the Fund go in two opposite
directions.
(a) In the current discussions on the future of the Fund, one of the most challenging
suggestions is to return to a pre-1948 situation, before the invention of conditionality and
the evolution of conditionality toward greater and greater involvement in structural policies
of members. The Fund's assistance would be unconditional and of a short-term nature,
essentially for monetary intervention purposes. This would obviously exclude all or most
developing countries from Fund assistance, as the correction of their balance of payments
usually requires structural adjustment. Even other countries would only qualify if the correction of their problem did not require any particular measures, which is rather unlikely.
In fact, the only countries qualifying for Fund assistance would probably be those that
need it least because the quality of their policies gives them easy access, at a low cost, to
financial markets. The unsuccessful (so far) experience with the Contingent Credit Lines,
a facility that has found no takers, is not a good omen for the usefulness of the Fund under
this proposal.
(b) At the other end of the political spectrum, there are suggestions for using Fund
resources for generalized debt forgiveness beyond the HIPC initiative. The problem with
debt forgiveness is that, once it is recognized as a moral obligation of the international
community, it is quickly perceived as an entitlement, which authorizes inappropriate policies
among debtors and imprudent lending among creditors. Debt forgiveness tends to be addictive; it may also clear the way for renewed excessive borrowing and resource misallocation if there is an expectation of future debt forgiveness. There are clearly humane considerations in favor of debt forgiveness but, if it is financed with public money, it is the
ultimate form of moral hazard and, if the burden falls on private lenders, it leads either to
usury or to the suspension of all forms of credit.
2. The existence of the Fund has been questioned by its detractors in two different
ways. Some would like to see it abolished. Others would like to have it merged with the
World Bank.
(a) Those who see the Fund as a harmful institution fall into two groups. One group
believes that balance of payments assistance should no longer be extended and debtor countries should have to fend for themselves. This seems to ignore the major risks that this
nonassistance by the Fund would generate: either a need for bilateral assistance, on a caseby-case basis, or a return to a "beggar thy neighbor" policy. Moreover, the Fund is not only
a provider of financial assistance. It performs a number of other functions and some other
agency would have to be created to fill the gap created by the abolition of the Fund.
Another group blames the Fund for being too strict. However, this would militate for a
relaxation of Fund conditionality, not for a termination of Fund assistance. Moreover, the
same question as above about the Fund's other functions would arise.
(b) In light of the related and sometimes overlapping functions of the World Bank and
the Fund, why not merge them? This would have at least one advantage: conflicting advice
would not be given to the same country requesting financial assistance. The new organiVOL. 35, NO. 4
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zation would be endowed with the resources of both the Fund and the Bank, which could
be used for balance of assistance and development purposes. However, two main issues
would have to be resolved. The first one is whether the new organization would be a purely
financial institution or would retain the other roles of the Fund, in particular, as a regulatory
agency. The second issue arises from the differences in the financial structure of the two
institutions: the Fund's resources come exclusively from its members and, while the Fund
could under its Articles borrow from the private sector, this has not happened. The Fund
sees itself as a non-profit making cooperative institution for the mutual benefit of its members; as such it should not be dependent upon the willingness of financial markets to provide
the financing that may be needed for the Fund's rescue operations. In contrast, the World
Bank's subscribed capital is mainly a guarantee of the Bank's solvency; only a small part of
the capital is paid-up and most of the financing comes from financial markets. The reason
is that the World Bank is supposed to make profitable investments, including in the private
sector, which is not the case for the Fund. The differences between the two institutions
may not be irreconcilable, but if the solution were a merger into one organization with two
totally separate departments, it would be a complicated way of achieving nothing.
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